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ADOPTION IN MINNESOTA
Creation of the parent-child relation by adoption has been prac-
ticed and legally recognized since early times but, curiously enough,
was unknown to the common law of England." As a result, the
methods and consequences of legal adoption are governed solely
by statute in the United States2 and England. 3
Minnesota has frequently been referred to as a state that has
gone far in solving its child-welfare problems 4 and adoption is no
exception. But even though our adoption statutes were basically
sound prior to last year, areas did exist which needed strengthen-
ing and clarification; so consideration of the adoption laws and
techniques in this state was included within the undertaking of a
commission created in 1949 to study a large portion of the law
of domestic relations.5 As a consequence, a new adoption act
was proposed by the commission in 19516 and enacted into law in
substantially the recommended form.7
Adoption is not a subject of minimal importance in regard to
either volume or social significance. It is estimated that about
50,000 children are adopted annually in the United States" and
the rate is accelerating." Minnesota's portion of this total is signifi-
cant. During the fiscal year 1948-1949, 1,943 new petitions for
adoption were filed and 1,994 adoption petitions were heard by the
courts of this state.10 Unquestionably, the combined impact of
1. See In re Adoption of Jaren, 223 Minn. 561, 567, 27 N. W. 2d 656,
660 (1947); Quarles, The Law of Adoptio*-A Legal Anomaly, 32 Marq.
L. Rev. 237 (1949) ; Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 Col. L. Rev. 332
(1922). However, adoptions de facto were not uncommon in England. See
Lockridge, Adopting a Child 3 (1947) ; 93 Sol. J. 505 (1949).
2. Quarles, supra note 1, at 241. Texas and Louisiana may be regarded
as exceptions because they inherited Spanish law and French civil law re-
spectively. Ibid.
3. The first adoption act in England, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 29, was passed
in 1926. For a complete discussion and analysis of the adoption law in Eng-
land today, see Josling, Adoption of Children (2d ed. 1950).
4. See Heisterman, State Supervision of Children Born Out of Wed-
lock. 7 Social Serv. Rev. 254, 255 (1933) ; Nims, The Illinois Adoption Law
and Its Administration 2 (1928).
5. Minn. Laws 1949, c. 736.
6. For the complete text of the proposed act, see Report of Minnesota
Interim Commission on Domestic Relations Problems 36-41 (1951).
7. Minn. Stat. Ann. §259.21 et seq. (Supp. 1951).
8. See United States Children's Bureau, To Safeguard the Adopted
Child, 14 The Child 144 (1950) ; Lockridge, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1.
9. Lockridge, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1 (based upon the number of
adoptions granted in the courts of greater New York).
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these adoptions upon the social structure of the community was
substantial and every lawyer has a duty to preserve and improve
this social structure whenever possible. Furthermore, in no field
of law is a more intimate fiduciary relationship established be-
tween attorney and client than when prospective adoptive parents,
in their attempt to acquire a child of their own, seek aid of coun-
sel. 1' The lawyer can best fulfill these confidences placed in him
by society and his client by insuring that the adoption is both
socially desirable and legally incontestable.
The social aspects of adoption will not be treated in this Note
but, obviously, both the law and child-welfare agencies must do
their part if the various interests of child, natural parents and
adoptive parents are to be fairly balanced and adequately protected
in adoption proceedings. Indeed, the legal framework provided
by the adoption statutes, which is the subject matter to be treated
here, will be a mere shell and of little consequence if the complex
social problems involved are not properly handled.
The adoption statutes of the separate states are diversified and
no comparison of that law is made in this Note" but the case law
of foreign jurisdictions will be resorted to when necessary.
I. PETITION, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Adoption proceedings are instituted by petition. If the petitioner
is married the spouse must join in the petition" because joinder
will probably insure family harmony and inure to the welfare of
the child by rendering impossible the undesirable situation in
which one party to a marriage does not legally assume parental
obligations toward a child who must live in the same home. How-
ever, joinder may also create problems. While the Minnesota
statutes forestall any possibility that joinder may change the status
of the relationship between the child and natural parent who is the
10. See Annual Report Minnesota Division of Social Welfare 23(1949). Last year 1,766 new petitions were filed. See Annual Report Mkinne-
sota Division of Social Welfare 22 (1951).
11. See Miller, The Lawyer's Place in Adoptions, 21 Tenn. L. Rev.
630 (1951); Love, How Adoption Proceedings Should be Handled, 21
Okla. B. J. 605 (1950)..
12. For a comparison of the adoption laws of the different states, see
Leavy, Adoption Law Simplified (1948). For a complete collection of all the
state statutes with supplements but no comparison, see Huston, Social Wel-
fare Laws of the 48 States (1937).
13. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.23(2) (Supp. 1951).
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spouse of the petitioning stepparent,' 4 joinder does pose a question
whether a person can adopt without the consent of his spouse who
is legally separated from him'" or who is insane. Interestingly
enough, there are no Minnesota cases on the point notwithstand-
ing the presence of the word "married" in the adoption statute for
over 40 years. However, it would seem that an adoption under
such circumstances would be inadvisable.
Allegations regarding the background of the child, marital
status of the petitioner, motive for adoption and similar informa-
tion must be made in the petition"6 and verified by the Director
of Social Welfare after filing.17 The risk that factors extrinsic to
the adoption itself, such as a void marriage, will later upset the
adoption is thereby reduced. The new act provides that the form
and content of the petition are subject to change under the Supreme
Court's rule-making power'8 but the Court in promulgating the new
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure made them inapplicable to
adoption proceedings insofar as they are inconsistent with present
adoption practice and procedure. 9
Original jurisdiction in adoption proceedings is vested in the
district courts2" but when this jurisdiction may be exercised and a
14. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.29 (Stipp. 1951). It has been suggested that
a natural parent who is the spouse of the petitioning stepparent need not
join in the petition. See Essentials of Adoption Law and Procedure 12 (Fed.
Sec. Agency, Children's Bureau 1949). There seems to be little to choose from
between this and the Minnesota method of dealing with the problem.
15. The legal separation contemplated here does not include persons
who are single because of a former divorce. Persons who have this marital
status may apply for the adoption of a child and their request may be
granted. See Problems and Procedures in Adoption 15 (U.S. Dep't Labor,
Children's Bureau 1941).
16. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.23(2) (Supp. 1951). The importance of
verification is discussed in Problems and Procedures in Adoption 62-63 (U.S.
Dep't Labor, Children's Bureau 1941).
17. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.27 (Supp. 1951).
18. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.23(3) (Supp. 1951).
19. Minn. R. Civ. P. 81.01 and Appendix A (1952).
20. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.23(1) (Supp. 1951). The argument has
been made that actions for the purpose of terminating parental rights may
involve real legal issues but that once such rights have been terminated,
decreeing an adoption is essentially a matter of sound social practice. See
Problems and Procedures in Adoption 83 (U.S. Dep't Labor, Children's
Bureau 1941). As Minnesota does not require a separate action to determine
parental rights prior to the adoption hearing, it would logically follow from
the above argument that the courts which should have jurisdiction in adop-
tion cases in this state are the district courts. However, the distinction be-
tween "legal" and "social" issues as applied is unsound because all actions
to shift custody really involve social issues in the main. This being so, thejuvenile courts ordinarily would be best qualified to hear and decide adop-
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final decree of adoption entered is questionable. The case law of
other states on the point is unsteady21 and the statutes are incon-
clusive. Under the statute any person who has resided in the state
for a year or more may petition to adopt any child or adult but the
length of residence may be waived by the court when in the best
interests of the child.2 2 This provision does not provide a clear-cut
answer as to just who may adopt because the word "resides" is
ambiguous and may mean either mere physical presence within the
state or domicile.2 3 Therefore, in theory at least, the court could
exercise its power of waiver and make it possible for anyone within
the geographical confines of the state to adopt.24 Although the
statute contains no residency limitation in respect to who may be
adopted, it has been urged that jurisdiction in adoption should be
conditioned upon the adoptive parents and child having a common
domicile in the state of the adoption proceedings.2 5 While this con-
dition would be met in most cases, it is readily apparent that it
would prove cumbersome an(. create inequities in other cases. Ac-
cordingly, the Minnesota court in In re Adoption of Pratt26 said that
it had jurisdiction to order the adoption of a child who had been
physically present within the state for a short time regardless of
the child's technical domicile. In fact, a person would still be within
the literal scope of the statute if he petitioned to adopt a child not
presently within the state but: whom he intended to bring or have
tion cases. But the state-wide juvenile court system necessary to handle
adoption proceedings efficiently cannot be attained without constitutional
amendments. See Report of Minnesota Interim Commission on Domestic
Relations Problems 6 (1951).
21. See 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 713-716 (1935) ; Newbold, Jurisdic-
tional and Social Aspects of Adoption, 11 Minn. L. Rev. 605 (1927).
22. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.22 (Supp. 1951).
23. The word "resides" in other statutes has caused the Minnesota
court considerable difficulty. See State v. School Bd., 206 Minn. 63, 287
N. W. 625 (1939) (broad sense of merely being inhabitant) ; In re Seidel,
204 Minn. 357, 283 N. W. 742 (1939) (physical presence coupled with intent
to make home in county).
24. But see 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 714 (1935). Because an ade-
quate social investigation, which is required unless waived by the court,
would be difficult to attain where the petitioners did not make their home in
the state, the probability that the court would exercise its waiver power in
such cases is slim.
25. See 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 713-714 (1935) ; Newbold, supra
note 21 (this author probably would not require common domicile where
the statutes require a social inquiry). A child has the same domicile as that
of the person or guardian having his custody. In re Adoption of Pratt, 219
Minn. 414, 18 N. W. 2d 147 (194.5) ; Buckman v. Houghton, 202 Minn. 460,
278 N. W. 908 (1938).
26. 219 Minn. 414, 18 N. W. 2d 147 (1945).
[Vol. 36:383
NOTES
brought into the state. While it is unlikely that a petition for adop-
tion would be filed before the child has entered the state, a person
may want to bring a child into the state for purposes of placing
him out or adopting him himself. When these circumstances arise,
Minnesota's child importation statute27 must be noted and carefully
followed and a check must be made to ascertain whether the child
exportation statute, if any, of the exporting state has been complied
with. The best interests of the child will be protected in these sit-
uations because Minnesota requires that an adequate social inquiry
conducted by a qualified child-welfare agency precede all adoptions
unless waived by the court.28
The particular district in which an adoption proceeding may be
heard is a matter of venue, the proper venue in the first instance
being the county of the petitioners' residence. 29 If the petitioners
have moved recently and are better known in the county of the
former residence, a change of venue is permissible if the court feels
that the convenience of the witnesses or the ends of justice will be
promoted by a change.30 Thus a flexibility is provided that may
prove highly desirable.
II. CONSENT IN ADOPTION
Unquestionably the State acting through its legislature may,
as parens patriae, regulate the custody of a child during his minority
so as to promote the child's welfare.-1 But may a court, through the
exercise of a discretion wholly independent from the medium of
statutory construction, contribute to the best interests of the child
under the same doctrine? The Minnesota court in In re Adoption
27. Minn. Stat. § 257.05 (1949). It is questionable whether any re-
quirements of the statute apply to a resident of the state who brings a child
into the state for adoption into his own family. Minnesota also has a child
exportation statute. Minn. Stat. § 257.06 (1949).
28. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.27 (Supp. 1951). For a statement of the
situations in which the court may use its power of waiver, see text to note
87 infra. It is interesting to note that the court waived the necessity for
a social inquiry in the Pratt case. A more appropriate procedure would be to
have part of the social study made by a qualified agency of the state from
which the child came and forwarded to an agency of the state in which the
adoption proceedings are pending. See Essentials of Adoption Law and
Procedure 17 (Fed. Sec. Agency, Children's Bureau 1949).
29. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.23(1) (Supp. 1951).
30. Minn. Stat. § 542.11(4) (1949).
31. In re Adoption of Anderson, 50 N. W. 2d 278 (Minn. 1951) ; In re
Adoption of Pratt, 219 Minn. 414, 18 N. W. 2d 147 (1945).
1952]
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of Jaren,3 2 a case involving an issue of consent, appears to have
answered this question in the affirmative. Vithout an attempt to
define "State" as including or excluding any of the three traditional
branches of government, this approach seems desirable and nec-
essary in "hard" cases where complex social problems face the court.
This is especially so in adoption because a body of lawmakers con-
fronted with the many social and economic problems placed before
them for prompt action cannot possibly foresee and adequately pro-
vide for all contingenciesthat may come before the court in adoption
proceedings. However, the statutes as construed no doubt will be
determinative in the vast majority of cases and a discussion of the
statutory consent necessary in adoption will be profitable even
though the validity of the position apparently taken in the Jaren
case is granted.
The consensual aspect of adoption has been controlled by the
state legislatures in detail. In Minnesota, consent by the natural
parents is required unless the parent is in some way incapacitated
under the statutes33 or the adoptee is an adult.34 The parent is so
incapacitated and his consent. may be dispensed with when he (1)
is the father of an illegitimate child,35 (2) is adjudged insane or
incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction,"' (3) has lost
custody of the child through a prior adoption decree or through a
final commitment by the juvenile court declaring the child dependent
or neglected, 37 or (4) has abandoned the child or lost custody
through divorce proceedings but has received notice of the adoption
hearing.38
32. 223 Minn. 561, 27 N. W. 2d 656 (1947). The court did state that
legislative authority furnishes the basis for and provides the methods to be
employed for accomplishing the act of adoption. Id. at 567, 27 N. W. 2d at
660. However, the court apparently did not base its decision on the statutes
even though it could have done so under the facts by holding that a subsequent
modification of a divorce order is part of the main divorce action or that the
words "divorce proceedings" of the statute in force at that time embraced
modifications of the divorce order that changed custody of the child. See Minn.
Stat. § 259.03 (1945).
33. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.24(1) (Supp. 1951).
34. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.24(4) (Supp. 1951).
35. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.24(1) (a) (Supp. 1951). The consent of the
mother of an illegitimate child is not dispen-ed with. Minn. Stat. Ann. §
259.24(1) (Supp. 1951) ; State v. Beardsley, 149 Minn. 435, 183 N. W. 956
(1921) : see State v. Juvenile Court, 147 Minn. 222, 224, 179 N. W. 1006
(1920).
36. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.24(1) (d) (Supp. 1951).
37. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.24(1) (c) (Supp. 1951).
38. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.24(1) (b) (Supp. 1951).
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These statutory provisions abrogating the necessity for consent
are clear and concise with the exception of those cases involving
abandonment and loss of custody in divorce. Abandonment is a
nebulous concept and has caused the courts difficulty in adoption
cases.3' In Minnesota, the only criterion for child abandonment is
set out in the criminal abandonment statute which requires an
"intent wholly to abandon.""0 This test impliedly elevates the in-
terests of the natural parents while our adoption statutes are to be
liberally construed so as to promote the welfare of the child, a
consideration to which every other interest must give way in
event of conflict. 4' Is it not possible then that the test for criminal
abandonment will frustrate the desirable aim of our adoption stat-
utes ?-2 The most plausible solution to the problem when it arises
will be to treat the adoption statutes as a modifier of the criminal
statute in adoption cases where abandonment is in issue. This
will allow the trial courts the flexibility necessary if fair decisions
are to be reached in such cases.
The loss of custody through divorce provisions may also prove
troublesome. The spouse losing custody in a divorce action should
be afforded the opportunity to be heard for the purpose of deter-
mining his right to custody whenever the spouse awarded custody
later consents to the child's adoption.4 ' Either consent to or notice
of pending adoption proceedings will furnish this safeguard but,
as evidenced by a split of opinion in this state,44 a choice between
the two alternatives is not easy.
Although the statute literally dispenses with the need for con-
sent in all cases where custody is lost through divorce, arguments
can be made that the wordage is deceiving. The trouble arises be-
cause the courts have drawn a distinction between "conditional or
39. See Note, 60 Yale L. J. 1240 (1951) where the law of abandonment
as related to adoption proceedings is fully discussed.
40. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 617.55 (1949); see Note, 60 Yale L. J. 1240,
1246 n. 19 (1951).
41. It re Adoption of Anderson, 50 N. W. 2d 278 (Minn. 1951) ; it re
Adoption of Jaren, 223 Minn. 561, 569, 27 N. W. 2d 656, 661 (1947).
42. The only reported case on the type of abandonment necessary to dis-
pense with the parent's consent under the Minnesota adoption statutes may
provide an insight to the answer of this question. See In re Adoption of Ander-
son, 189 Minn. 85, 248 N. W. 657 (1933).
43. Bell v. Krauss, 169 Cal. 387, 146 Pac. 874 (1915).
44. Compare Report of Minnesota Interim Commission on Domestic
Relations Problems 37-38 (1951) (proposed act makes no provision dis-
pensing with consent of parent losing custody in divorce action), with Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 259.24(1) (b) (Supp. 1951).
1952]
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temporary" custody and "absolute or permanent" deprivation of
custody. At the outset it must: be admitted that in theory this last
mentioned term is a misnomer because even a final commital order
by judgment of a juvenile court does not absolutely, without pos-
sible recourse, deprive a parent of custody.45 Indeed, adoption itself
does not necessarily preclude the natural parents from regaining
the custody of the child through re-adoption! The judicially adopted
terms are even less appropriate in respect to ordinary guardianship
and custody orders but, nevertheless, they are useful concepts for
purposes of discussion.
Divorce decrees are generally subject to modification and
change" and when contrasted with other custody orders the fre-
quency and degree of change is comparatively free. Therefore,
divorce decrees may provide an area where distinctions based on
the degree of permanency break down almost completely. However,
the cases do not support this position. The Nevada court in In re
Jackson47 held that when the custody granted in a divorce action is
conditional, the consent of the person deprived of custody must be
obtained before adoption notwithstanding a statutory provision
comparable to that in Minnesota. A similar decision was reached
by the Washington court in In re Lease4" where the statute af-
firmatively provided for adoption with the consent of the spouse
retaining custody as distinguished from statutory language dis-
pensing with the necessity for the consent of the spouse deprived of
custody. Both courts indirectly exalted the interests of the natural
parents by construing their adoption statutes strictly because in
derogation of the common law. However, the Minnesota court has
rejected this doctrine of strict: construction as applied to adoption
statutes49 and, if presented with the issue, probably would not reach
the same result.
Another question may arise when the reasons for which a divorce
45. Minn. Stat. § 260.11 (1949) ; see In. re Adoption of Anderson, 50
N. W. 2d 278, 284 (Minn. 1951).
46. See Minn. Stat. § 518.18 (1949) ; Spratt v. Spratt, 151 'Minn. 458,
187 N. W. 227 (1921); 25 N. D. Bar Briefs 24 (1949).
47. 55 Nev. 174, 28 P. 2d 125 (1935) (statute provided that consent
of person divorced because of cruelty, adultery or abandonment not needed).
48. 99 Wash. 413, 169 Pac. 816 (1918). But cf. Hardesty v. Hardesty,
150 Kan. 271, 92 P. 2d 49 (1939) (right of visitation held not custody) ; In re
Beers' Adoption, 78 Wash. 576, 139 Pac. 629 (1914) (although no indication
that divorce decree granted absolute custody, distinguished in Lease case on
this ground).
49. See note 41 supra.
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may be granted are inspected. Suppose A becomes insane and B,
her spouse, is granted a divorce and awarded custody of their child.
B then marries C and both petition to adopt the child but A in the
interim has regained her sanity.50 Should A be entitled to notice
under the statute or should her consent be required-in other words,
should a fault test be used by the court in construction of the statute?
If so, it must be a "no fault" test, for' a "comparative fault" test
would render the adoption statute meaningless in the many cases
where fault for the divorce is equally attributal to both parties.
Cases in which recriminatory defenses have been sustained are
illustrative.
Notwithstanding the above discussion of anticipated problems,
it appears that the Minnesota statute does and should dispense with
the necessity for the consent of the spouse losing custody through
divorce in all cases. Furthermore, the procedural device of notice
is a more feasible choice than the substantive right of consent be-
cause it has the advantage of avoiding a separate suit to terminate
parental rights when the parent who has lost custody is obviously
not worthy of custody and yet arbitrarily refuses to consent to the
adoption. Where consent is not required, the present Minnesota
practice does not require termination of parental custody rights by
judicial decree before an adoption hearing may be held51 and, ap-
parently the court has no inclination to require consent, which may
make a separate suit necessary, unless the statute clearly demands
such a decision.52 It is a fair assumption that notice will prove to be
adequate protection of the natural parent's rights whenever he has
lost custody in a divorce action.-3
The statutes may also require the consent of persons other than
the natural parents either in a supplementary or substitutionary
capacity. Where the adoptee is over 14 years of age his consent is
50. Incurable insanity is a ground for divorce in Minnesota if the insane
spouse has been confined to an institution for five years immediately pre-
ceding the divorce. Minn. Stat. § 518.06(7) (1949). Although the case posed
in the text is not likely to arise under this section, it may arise when the
divorce is granted in another state and the adoption petition is subsequently
filed in Minnesota.
51. See In re Adoption of Anderson, 139 Minn. 85, 248 N. W. 657 (1933)
(the trial court decided an issue of abandonment in the same action in which
the adoption decree was entered; reversed on grounds of no abandonment
shown).
52. See it re Adoption of Jaren, 223 Minn. 561, 571, 27 N. W. 2d 656,
663 (1947) (child's future too important to permit further delay).
53. But see Note, 60 Yale L. J. 1240, 1248 n. 29 (1951) ; Problems and
Procedures in Adoption 85 (U. S. Dep't Labor, Children's Bureau 1941).
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needed 4 and the consent of a guardian, if any, is always required55
no matter how unreasonably it may be withheld.5 6 The consent of
the director is desirable and may be given where there is no parent
or guardian qualified to consent,5 7 but his consent is not essential
and cannot be unreasonably withheld so as to bar the adoption. 9
If the mother of an illegitimate child is under 18 years of age, the
additional consent of either her parents, guardian or the director,
depending upon the facts, is required. 59 Apparently the requirement
for supplementing consents in the latter case was imposed to insure
compliance with the common law rule that a contract based on the
consent of a minor is voidable.60 Although desirable, it is clear that
this bulwark of supporting consents is not necessary, to render the
minor mother's consent valid and binding. 1
Parental rights and obligations may also be relinquished by
written agreement with the director or a certified agency conferring
authority to place the child for adoption6 2 and the director or agency
will thereafter have the exclusive right to consent to the child's
adoption.63 Although a similar written agreement between a parent
and another person conferring upon such person the right to adopt
54. Minn. Stat Ann. § 259.24(3) (Supp. 1951).
55. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.24(1) (Supp. 1951). Where the consent of
a guardian appointed by the probate court is given, a subsequent annulment
of the guardianship order by the court will not invalidate the consent ab initio
unless the order was absolutely void in the first instance. In re Adoption of
Anderson, 50 N.W. 2d 278 (Minn. 1951) ; i't re Adoption of Pratt, 219 Minn.
414, 18 N. W. 2d 147 (1945).
56. In re Adoption of Mair, 184 Minn. 29, 237 N. W. 596 (1931) (pro-
ceedings to correct the situation must be brought in probate court to prevent
conflict between the probate and district courts).
57. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.24(1) (e) (Supp. 1951).
58. It re Adoption of Kure, 197 Minn. 234, 266 N. W. 746 (1936)
(State Board of Control [now Director of Social Welfare, M inn. Stat. § 256.01
(1949)] refused to consent because adoptive parents and child had different
religions).
59. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.24(2) (Supp. 1951).
60. See Note, 35 Minn. L. Rev. 47 (1950).
61. In re Adoption of Anderson, 50 N. W. 2d 278 (Minn. 1951) (agree-
ment with agency consenting to child's placement for adoption hel valid
although signed only by minor mcther of illegitimate child) ; In re Bush, 47
Kan. 264, 27 Pac. 1003 (1891) (by implication) ; see 21 Fla. L. J. 102 (1947)
Rep. Att'y Gen. Minn. 288, Op. 228 (1940).
62. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.25(1) (Supp. 1951).
63. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.24(1) (f) (Supp. 1951) ; cf. In e Adoption
of Anderson, 50 N. W. 2d 278 (Minn. 1951) (in construing the 1947 statutes
the court held that when after the signing of the agreemeet the probate court,
sitting as the juvenile court, appointed the agency as guardian the mother's
consent was no longer necessary).
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would not create legally binding obligations respecting custody,64
apparently it would constitute consent when filed if properly ex-
ecuted.
All consents must be in writing and filed prior to the hearing.66
This procedure and form were formerly followed as a matter of
practice 67 but were not necessary to sustain an adoption decree
against collateral attacks. s
The requirement for consent of the natural parents is primarily
for their protection. Once their consent is rendered, the proposed
adoptive parents will probably act in reliance upon it by caring
for the child in their home and filing a petition for his adoption.
After the petition has been filed, the statute provides that the court
will grant a request to withdraw consent only when in the best in-
terests of the child. 9 This apparent importance placed by the legis-
lature upon the filing of the petition appears to be unwarranted and
becomes significant because the leading Minnesota case of State
v. Beardsley70 indicates that consent can still be arbitrarily with-
drawn at any time prior to the filing of the petition. Fortunately,
agreements with the director or agency conferring authority to place
for adoption were not afforded the same treatment and may be re-
voked only when in the best interests of the child whether the pe-
tition has been filed or not.7 1 Revocation is probably possible here
even though the agency or director has had the court enter a com-
mital order which is a final adjudication of parental rights.72
III. NOTICE IN ADOPTION
The case law dealing with a parent's right to notice in adoption
where the necessity for his consent has in some way been obviated
64. Minn. Stat. § 257.02 (1949); State v. Beardsley, 149 Minn. 435,
183 N. W. 956 (1921).
65. See note 66 infra.
66. Alinn. Stat. Ann. § 259.24(5) (Supp. 1951). The proposed act, see
note 6 supra, recommended that the consents of all natural parents residing
in the state be made in the presence of the director or a representative of
a certified child-placing agency. This was omitted in the statue but consent
must be acknowledged and witnessed by two persons.
67. See Problems and Procedures in Adoption 92 (U. S. Dep't Labor,
Children's Bureau 1941).
68. It re Estate of Sutton, 161 Minn. 426, 201 N. W. 925 (1925) (de-
cree recited consent; all jurisdictional prerequisites are presumed unless the
contrary affirmatively appears from the face of the record).
69. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.24(6) (Supp. 1951).
70. 149 Minn. 435, 183 N. W. 956 (1921) semble. But see 32 Minn.
L. Rev. 496, 497-498 (1948).
71. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.25(2) (Supp. 1951).
72. See note 45 supra.
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is confused .7 Due regard for the constitutional safeguard which re-
quires an opportunity to be heard would seem to cogently argue
that a parent's rights to his child cannot be severed by adoption
without notice.7 4 When the loss of custody occurs prior to the adop-
tion proceeding, the parent should at least be informed at that time
of his rights or disabilities in the event that his child is subsequently
made the subject of an adoption. However, the opinion of the
United States Children's Bureau75 and some cases76 do not support
this contention.
Minnesota adoption procedure meets this seemingly minimal
standard. If consent has not been given and notice has not been
effectively waived in writing, notice of the hearing on the petition
to adopt generally must be given the parents and guardian.7 7 To
this general rule there are two exceptions. Notice to the father
of an illegitimate child is discretionary and not mandatory78 and
when a court of competent jurisdiction7 9 makes a final commit-
ment and enters judgment declaring a child dependent or neglected
only the guardian need be notified of the adoption hearing proper.s0
However, the notification of ":he dependency and neglect proceed-
ings must also include a statement informing the parent that he
73. For a detailed analysis of the cases dealing with a parent's right
to notice in adoption, see Maxwell, Right of Natural Parents to Notice in
Adoption Proceedings, 24 N. D. Bar Briefs 192 (1948).
74. A possible exception might be where there have been prior abandon-
ment proceedings to which the parent was given notice but did not appear.
Id. at 197; see Note, 60 Yale L. J. 1240, 1248 n. 27 (1951). That such an
exception would be advisable is further supported by the fact that publica-
tion of notice of the adoption probably would not bring the unknown parent
into court. See Problems and Procedures in Adoption 126 (U. S. Dep't Labor,
Children's Bureau 1941).
75. The Bureau has advocated that either consent to adoption or the
termination of parental rights must take place before an adoption petition
can be filed and not notice of any kind of subsequent adoption proceedings is
contemplated in the latter situation. See Essentials of Adoption Law and
Procedure 7, 13 (Fed. Sec. Agency, Children's Bureau 1949).
76. Hardesty v. Hardesty, 150 Kan. 271, 92 P. 2d 49 (1939) (father
given custody in divorce action and adoption decreed without notice to
mother) ; In re Beers' Adoption, 78 Wash. 576, 139 Pac. 629 (1914) (mother
given custody in divorce action and adoption decreed without notice to father).
77. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.26(1) (Supp. 1951).
78. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.2-5(2) (Supp. 1951). The court may within
its discretion require notice to be served upon the admitted or adjudicated
father of an illegitimate child or any other person if it believes justice will be
promoted thereby.
79. The type of court that is competent to try dependency and neglect
cases varies with the population of the county. It may in actuality be either
the district court or the probate court. See Minn. Stat. §§ 260.02, 260.03
(1949).
80. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.26(3) (Supp. 1951).
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will not be entitled to notice of subsequent adoption proceedings if
the court makes a final commitment."- This new innovation and
additional safeguard 2 in the doctrine of notice in this state ap-
pears to be both adequate and desirable here for at least two
reasons. First, it informs the parent of the real significance of a
final decree of guardianship in neglect and dependency proceed-
ings. Second, notice of the hearing for adoption probably would
serve no beneficial purpose but it might destroy the anonymity
between adoptive parents and natural parents.83
Where notice is required, it may be given in substantially the
same way as service of summons in a civil action and, if personal
service cannot be had, the court may order service by publication.
4
IV. THE SOCIAL INQUIRY AND PROBATIONARY RESIDENCE
It is generally agreed by judges 3 and experts in the field of
child-welfare' that a social inquiry should be conducted by a
qualified agency and a report of the findings and recommendations
be submitted to the court before formal adoption can take place.
81. Minn. Stat. § 260.08 (1949), as amended, Minn. Laws 1951, c. 224.
If a final commitment is subsequently ordered, the parents must again be
notified that they will not be entitled to notice of any adoption proceedings.
Minn. Stat. § 260.12 (1949), as amended, Minn. Laws 1951, c. 223.
82. Prior to 1951 the parent was not entitled to any notice in addition
to the notice of the dependency or neglect hearing. Minn. Stat. § 260.08
(1949) ; cf. In re Adoption of Anderson, 50 N. W. 2d 278 (Minn. 1951) (child
was declared dependent and agency with which parent had signed agreement
was adjudged guardian by the court; parent held not entitled to notice of
later adoption). As an agency will invariably have the child declared de-
pendent and itself appointed guardian after such an agreement has been made,
the new amendments providing for the negative type of notice will govern
almost all such cases. But if the agency or director fails to have itself ap-
pointed guardian, would the parent signing the agreement then be entitled to
notice of the adoption hearing or would the agreement constitute the consent
required under § 259.26(1), thereby making notice unnecessary?
83. The Legislature and the commission apparently were of different
opinions as to the importance of preserving anonymity where there had not
been a prior final commital order in dependency or neglect proceedings. Com-
pare Report of Minnesota Interim Commission on Domestic Relations Prob-
lems 41 (1951) (proposed act would not allow natural parents to attend the
adoption hearing proper), with Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.31 (Supp. 1951).
84. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.26(2) (Supp. 1951). Notice must be served
within or without the state at least 14 days before hearing.
85. See Clark, Proposed Changes in Missouri Laws Affecting Children:
Recommendations of the Children's Code Commission, 12 Mo. L. Rev. 310,
312 (1947) ; Problems and Procedures in Adoption 99 (U. S. DeD't Labor,
Children's Bureau 1941) ; Ricks, Legal Aspects of Adoption 7 (1937).
26. See Essentials of Adoption Law and Procedure 16 (Fed. Sec.
Agency, Children's Bureau 1949). But see Maddux, The Case for Adop-
tion (1947) where the author severely criticizes agency participation in
adoptions.
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To facilitate and make more meaningful this social inquiry, a pro-
bationary period of residence in the proposed adoptive home is also
desirable before an adoption is finally adjudged.A7 Both of these
statutory safeguards have been provided for in Minnesota since
1917 and may be waived by the court only when the petitioner is a
stepparent or when upon gocd cause shown the court is satisfied
that the proposed home and child are suited to each other." Al-
though it has been argued fromn the idealistic social standpoint that
neither the waiver of the inquiry" or residence requirement 0 is
desirable in any case, waiver serves a very practical purpose in
many instances and nothing is sacrificed because the director must
be given ten days notice of the hearings when the waiver power
is exercised."'
The county welfare boards may be delegated authority to con-
duct the home study upon which the director's report is based '
but the director is directly responsible for the approval or dis-
approval of all adoption petitions.93 If the director does not return
a report to the court within 90 days after the petition is filed, with-
out fault of the petitioner, the court may hear the petition after
five days notice to the director. 94 This procedure insures prompt
consideration of the prospective parents' natural desire to have a
child adjudged their own as soon as possible. If the director's re-
port disapproves of the petition, he may make a motion to dis-
miss.9 5 Thus the petition for adoption will ultimately be brought
87. See Essentials of Adoption Law and Procedure 18 (Fed. Sec.
Agency, Children's Bureau 1949); Ricks, Legal Aspects of Adoption 10(1937).
88. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.27 (Supp. 1951).
89. See Essentials of Adoption Law and Procedure 17 (Fed. Sec.
Agency, Children's Bureau 1949).
90. See Ricks, Legal Aspects of Adoption 10 (1937). But see Essentials
of Adoption Law and Procedure 18 (Fed. See. Agency, Children's Bureau
1949).
91. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.27 (Supp. 1951). The ten-day notice pro-
vision is new and evidently was aimed at the undesirable practice followed in
the Pratt case. See notes 26 and 28 supra.
92. See Annual Report Minnesota Division of Social Welfare 20-21
(1949) ; Problems and Procedures in Adoption 55 (U. S. Dep't Labor, Chil-
dren's Bureau 1941).
93. See Annual Report Minnesota Division of Social Welfare 23 (1949).
Of the 1,727 reports submitted to 1he district courts in 1950-1951, the director
approved 1,436, denied 6, continued 25 and acknowledged waiver of investiga-
tion in 260 others. See Annual Report Minnesota Division of Social Welfare
22 (1951).
94. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.27 (Supp. 1951).
95. Ibid.
[Vol. 36:383
to the court's attention and if the court dismisses or denies it, the
child will be replaced with his permanent guardian, if there be
one, or subsequent judicial action will be had to determine his
custody. 0 The child is thereby assured that he will not be left in
an unsuitable home.
Although the social aspects of adoption are not within the
scope of this Note, a cursory discussion of placement in this state
may be appropriate at this point. About 50 per cent of the -child
placements for adoption during 1948-1949 were accomplished with
agency assistance.9 7 When an agency is so involved, the nature of
the steps taken in placement will be such that both the investiga-
tion and probationary residence will have been completed prior
to the filing of the petition and a hearing may be had immediately.9
This will probably be true even though the placement is made
without agency help because anyone placing a child must notify
the director of such fact within 30 days after the placement99 and
the director will thereafter have the right to visit and investigate
the home in which the child was placed.100 If this notification re-
quirement is not complied with, a proper case-for the court's
exercise of its waiver power will probably still be presented as most
of the independent placements in this state are made with rela-
tives.' 0' In fact, only eleven per cent of the children placed for
adoption in Minnesota in 1951 were placed with non-relatives
without agency help. 102 This figure is a tribute to the agencies and
indicates that the "grey market" for babies in this area is not large,
a condition which is not general throughout the nation.10 3
V. HEARING AND DECREE
As an adoption is intimate and confidential in nature, the pro-
ceedings are held in closed court and the files and records of the
96. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.28(b) (Supp. 1951).
97. See Annual Report Minnesota Division of Social Welfare 23 (1949).
98. Child-placing agencies take the following steps in placing a child
for adoption. Application to adopt is made by the prospective adoptive parents.
The home is then studied and, if found suitable, a child is placed in it. The
child and home are then observed to see if they "fit." If the placement "takes,"
a petition to adopt is filed. Id. at 20.
99. Minn. Stat. § 257.03 (1949), as amended, Minn. Laws 1951, c. 644.
100. Minn. Stat.§ 257.04 (1949).
101. See Note 97 supra. Placements with relatives are arbitrarily cate-
gorized as independent placements although they are natural and do not
ordinarily have the inherent risks that other independent placements do.
102. See Annual Report Minnesota Division of Social Welfare 21
(1951).
103. Ibid.; Comment, 59 Yale L. J. 715 n. 2 (1950).
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proceeding are not open for public inspection.10 4 When an adop-
tion is decreed the child becomes the child of the petitioner and
his name may be changed to that alleged as desired in the peti-
tion.1"' If the petition is dismissed or denied for any reason the
child is adequately protected.10 6 Any party aggrieved by the decree
of the district court may take an appeal in the same manner as
appeals in other civil actions. '0 7
The relationship created between the adoptive parents and child
when the child is taken into the home becomes even closer after a
formal adoption is decreed and this status must be protected
against subsequent attacks to vacate the decree that may unduly
disturb it. The finality to be afforded an adoption is prescribed
and determined by the Minnesota court through application of the
concept of "substantial compliance" with the statutes"0 8 and all
jurisdictional prerequisites a:re conclusively presumed unless the
contrary affirmatively appears from the face of the record.100
Both the cases and the statutes indicate that setting aside an
adoption is no easy matter. The adoptive parents may gain an
annulment within certain defined and rigidly controlled statutory
grounds1 but once the child is taken into the home they, as well
104. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259,31 (Supp. 1951).
105. Minn. Stat. § 259.28(a) (Supp. 1951). Where there is a change
of name, the registrar prepares a supplementary birth certificate in the new
name of the adopted child and seals the original certificate. Minn. Stat. §
144.176 (1949), as amended, Mirn. Laws 1951, c. 175. A change of name
may be void if not alleged as desired in the petition but the omission will not
void the adoption decree in toto. In re Estate of Youmans, 218 Minn. 172,
177, 15 N. W. 2d 537, 540 (1944).
106. See note 96 supra.
107. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.32 (Supp. 1951).
108. See Kenning v. Reichel, 148 Minn. 433, 182 N. W. 517 (1921).
What is and what is not substantial compliance rests within the sound dis-
creation of the court. For example, the same omission probably will not
amount to a lack of jurisdiction in all cases and determination of the issue
may depend entirely upon who brings the action. Cf. Fiske v Lawton, 124
Minn. 85, 88, 144 N. W. 455, 456 (1913) (under contract to adopt, the heir
of the "adopting" parent could not avoid the "adoption" on the grounds that
the natural father did not consent and even the father would not be heard
to object after long delay).
109. In re Estate of Sutton, 161 Minn. 426, 201 N. W. 925 (1925).
110. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.30 (Supp. 1951). If within five years after
the adoption the child develops feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, insanity or vener-
eal infection as a result of conditions existing prior to the adoption of which
the adopting parents had no knowledge, an annulment is possible. The fact
that no appellate case has arisen under this section, which has remained un-
changed for over 30 years, probably is tribute to the careful child placement
and supervision by agencies in this state. The provision for annulment is
probably advisable. See Comment, U. of Det. L. J. 99 (1946). But see Es-
sentials of Adoption law and Procedure 22-23 (Fed. Sec. Agency, Children's
Bureau 1949).
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as their heirs and legal representatives, are generally estopped
from asserting that the decree is invalid."" However, even third
persons may win a rehearing on the merits if the trial court has
abused its discretion" 2 and there seems to be nothing in the statutes
that would oust the court of its power in equity to vacate an adop-
tion decree for fraud or other defects.
VI. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF ADOPTION
The status of an adopted child logically should be in all re-
spects and with respect to all persons exactly the same as that of a
natural child of the adoptive parents and any law that distinguishes
between an adopted and natural child should be amended to abro-
gate the existing differences.1 1'
Succinctly stated, the effect of an adoption in Minnesota con-
forms to this proposed aim. The statutes have long provided that
the child should inherit from his adoptive parents and their rela-
tives and they in turn should inherit from him in case of his death
intestate." 4 As a result, it has been decided under this section
that an adopted child has the same property rights as a natural
child"" and is the next of kin," 6 lawful issue and bodily heir of
the adoptive parent.17 Incidentally, the adoption statutes do not
affect the rights of any person to dispose of his property as he
wishes by an inter vivos or testamentary act but, if the adoptive
parent wishes to negate this benefit conferred upon the child by
law, he must do so in no uncertain terms.
At one time the statutes specifically provided that an adopted
child should inherit from his natural parents and their kindred." 8
111. Sec Kenning v. Reichel, 148 Minn. 433, 182 N. W. 517 (1921).
112. I re Adoption of Fay, 147 Minn. 472, 180 N. W. 533 (1920)
(grandparents of orphan had no notice of adoption; decree opened). A similar
case is possible under the new act because the court still has an area of dis-
cretion in which to require notice. See note 78 .rpra.
113. See Essentials of Adoption Law and Procedure 20 (Fed. Sec.
Agency, Children's Bureau 1949).
114. See Minn. Rev. Laws 1905, § 3616; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.29
(Supp. 1951). For a discussion of the rights of heirs and next of kin of the
adoptive parent to inherit from the adopted child, see 18 Minn. L. Rev. 67
(1933).
115. Bakke v. Bakke, 175 Minn. 193, 220 N. W. 601 (1928) ; see Oden-
breit v. Utheim, 131 Minn. 56, 59, 154 N. W. 741, 742 (1915) (child adopted
under parol contract).
116. McKeowm v. Argetsinger, 202 Minn. 595, 279 N. W. 402 (1938),
23 Minn. L. Rev. 83 (adopted child is next of kin and action for wrongful
death can be brought for his benefit).
117. In re Trust under Will of Holden, 207 Minn. 211, 291 N. W. 104
(1940).
118. See Minn. Gen. Stat. 1894, § 8023.
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This provision was deleted in subsequent revisions, but neverthe-
less it was held that the adopted child retained the right to inherit
from his natural parents. 19 However, the new act provides that
the natural parents do not inherit from the child and he does not
inherit from them,'2 0 but an unfortunate use of language in the new
statute still leaves open the question of the child's right to inherit
from his first adoptive parents when adopted a second time.1 2 Of
course, an analogy to the case of natural parents should govern
the problem.
The rights of inheritance given to the adopted child and adop-
tive parents will flow logically so as to affect all third persons.
Thus the Minnesota court held in Fiske v. Lawton"'2 that the
'issue of a person informally adopted under a contract made in
Ohio inherited through that adopted person according to Minne-
sota law. The decision follows the general rule that the rights of
inheritance of all adopted children, even though adopted in an-
other state, will be governed by the law of the state where the action
is brought. 2 3
Adoption statutes apply to all adopted children whether adopted
prior or subsequent to the passage of the statutes and because
rights of heirship are contingent and not vested, presumptive heirs
of the adoptive parents cannot complain that the statutes are retro-
spective.2 4 However, rights that have become vested but that have
119. Roberts v. Roberts, 160 Minn. 140, 199 N. W. 581 (1924).
120. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.29 (Supp. 1951). This provision also would
prevent the child from inheriting in a dual capacity when the adoptive parent
is also a blood relative. See 30 Minn. L. Rev. 395, 396 (1946).
121. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.29 (Supp. 1951). The statute uses the
words "natural parents" to negate the adopted child's rights of heirship in
relation to his natural parents; more appropriate terminology would be "all
preceding parents." The problem has been decided in Minnesota in favor of
the adopted child. In re Estate of Sutton, 161 Minn. 426, 201 N. W. 925
(1925) ; see 26 Minn. L. Rev. 114 (1941). Of course, where the first adoptive
parent dies before the second adoption the child would inherit directly from
his first adoptive parent as distinguished from through him but from that
parent's ancestors. The distinction would seem to turn upon the difference
between contingent and vested rights. If the ancestor died before the second
adoption, the right would also be vested.
122. 124 Minn. 85, 144 N. W. 455 (1913).
123. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 143 (1934). However, the Federal
Constitution does not require that a child adopted in a sister state be given
the same rights of inheritance in such cases. See [1950] U. of Ill. Law Forum
122.
124. Sorenson v. Rasmussen, 114 Minn. 324, 131 N. W. 325 (1911). For
the same reason, the heirs cannot complain of the act of adoption itself.
Kenning v. Reichel, 148 Minn. 433, 182 N. W. 517 (1921). The Missouri
court does not think the adoptive parent should be bound by such legislation
unless he gives a new consent. WAreber v. Griffiths, 349 Mo. 145, 152, 159
S. W. 2d 670, 674 (1942).
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not yet become possessory will not be affected by a subsequent
adoption or new legislation passed in the interim.1 25
VII. QUAsI-ADOPTION
When a child has not been adopted in accordance with the statu-
tory procedure but nevertheless has been adopted in fact, justice
often requires that he be given the protection of the law. According-
ly, the courts usually recognize the validity of de facto adoptions
and employ the legal theories of "equitable adoption," specific
performance of an implied promise and estoppel to enable the child
to share in the deceased adoptive parent's estate.126
The Minnesota court has many times conferred upon the child
the same property rights as a natural heir when a contract to adopt
was fully executed by him.127 Written contracts that set out the
child's property rights pose no problem but parol contracts to
adopt must be established by clear, positive and convincing proof. 128
However, once the contract to adopt is proved it is not necessary
to show that the parent also expressly or impliedly promised to
confer upon the child any property rights. The court will auto-
matically give the child the same rights of heirship that he would
have if he were a natural child of the adoptive parent.' 29 The
rationale used by the court to reach this result is not clear.
The parties to a contract to adopt are usually the natural and
adoptive parents with the adoptee at most a third-party beneficiary.
However, suppose the adoptee is an adult and enters into such a
125. O'Dell v. Hingeveld, 50 N. W. 2d 476 (Minn. 1951) (workmen's
compensation act defined "child" as anyone entitled by law to inherit from
the deceased employee; adopted child received share of workmen's compen-
sation benefits when natural father was killed in 1950 and case not settled
until after passage of 1951 adoption statutes).
126. For a discussion of these theories and the cases applying them see
Note, 12 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 253 (1951); Comment, 47 Mich L. Rev. 962(1949) ; 9 Ala. Lawyer 206 (1948).
127. In re Estate of Firle, 197 1finn. 1, 265 N. W. 818 (1936) ; Oden-
breit v. Utheim, 131 'Minn. 56, 154 N. W. 741 (1915) ; Fiske v. Lawton, 124
Minn. 85, 144 N. W. 455 (1913) (written agreement entered into in Ohio
and subsequently lost) ; cf. Laird v. Vila, 93 Minn. 45, 100 N. W. 656 (1904).
128. In re Estate of Norman, 209 Minn. 19, 295 N. W. 63 (1940) (the
court, relying upon the rather fine distinction between a foster and adopted
child, held that evidence was sufficient to support trial court's finding that
there was no contract to adopt) ; Odenbreit v. Utheim, 131 Minn. 56, 154
N. W. 741 (1915).
129. In re Estate of Firle, 197 MLinn. 1, 265 N. W. 818 (1936) ; Oden-
breit v. Utheim, 131 'Minn. 56, 154 N. W. 741 (1915) ; Fiske v. Lawton, 124
'Minn. 85, 144 N. W. 455 (1913). If a promise to give the promisee certain
property rights can be shown, that promise will control. Laird v. Vila, 93
Minn. 45, 100 N. W. 656 (1904).
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contract. Should the court decree a quasi-adoption to aid an adult
who is capable of contracting and caring for himself? The Missouri
court has expressly refused to do so on the grounds that such an
extension of the doctrine would open the door to many fraudulent
claims' 30 and some of the cases illustrate that this fear may be
justified.' 3' The adoption of adults even by means of the statutory
procedure has been criticized. 132 However, the Minnesota statutes,
which authorize the adoption of adults without the safeguard of
an independent investigation, :33 are probably not open to the argu-
ment set forth by the Missouri court. The court will scrutinize the
circumstances surrounding the petition very closely in the first
instance, which is not possible when there is a contract to adopt, and
in that way rid itself of subsequent harassing litigation involving
fraud or undue influence. Although the statutes do not require
notice here, it may. be wise to notify close relatives of the proposed
adoptive parent of the adoption hearing in these cases.
One court has held that it will not bestow rights of heirship
upon the person if he is not adopted in strict compliance with the
statutes, 13 4 but abolishing quasi-adoption, while perhaps ultimately
desirable, would result in injustice in many cases. Nevertheless,
allowing informal adoptions indirectly sanctions possible attendant
vices, which the statutory procedure was designed to prevent.
130. Thompson v. Moseley, 344 Mo. 240, 245, 125 S. W. 2d 860, 862
(1939).
131. See Bartholow v. Davies, 276 Ill. 505, 114 N. E. 1017 (1917)
Raymond v. Cooke, 226 Mass. 326, 115 N. E. 423 (1917) ; Stevens v. Halstead,
181 App. Div. 198, 168 N. Y. Supp. 142 (2d Dep't 1917) ; Hillers v. Taylor,
108 Md. 148, 69 Atl. 715 (1908).
132. See Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 Col. L. Rev. 332, 341-342(1922); Note, 26 Phil. L. J. 85, 89 (1951).
133. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.27 (Supp. 1951) is not applicable to adults.
134. Carter v. Capshaw, 249 Ky. 483, 60 S. W. 2d 959 (1933).
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